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Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Deception:
The Tobacco Industry and Airline Smoking
PEGGY LOPIPERO
DORIE E. APOLLONIO
LISA A. BERO
The provision of specialized information is widely viewed as one
of the most important functions of interest groups.1 Most research on inter-
est group behavior presumes that lobbyists rarely misrepresent evidence, due
to the risk of exposure and the need to work repeatedly with policymakers.2
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1 John M. Hansen, Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1991); Lester W. Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally,
1963); Kay L. Schlozman and John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy (New
York: Harper and Row, 1986); David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and
Public Opinion (New York: Knopf, 1951); Jeffrey M. Berry, The Interest Group Society (Boston, MA:
Little Brown, 1989); John R. Wright, Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and
Influence, New topics in Politics Series (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1996); Kevin M. Esterling, The
Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American National Politics (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).
2 Berry, Interest Group Society; Schlozman and Tierney, Organized Interests and American
Democracy; Ronald J. Hrebenar, ‘‘Change, Transition and Growth in Southern Interest Group
Politics’’ in Ronald J. Hrebenar and Clive S. Thomas, eds., Interest Group Politics in the Southern
States (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992); Marie Hojnacki and David M. Kimball,
‘‘Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress,’’ American Political Science
Review 92 (December 1998): 775–790; Ken Kollman, Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest
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Instead, interest groups are viewed as ‘‘information service bureaus’’ for policy-
makers, or an extension of research staff.3 Researchers on lobbying behavior
argue that having a reputation for providing accurate information is critical for
individual lobbyists,4 that their career incentives help maintain their honesty,
and that policymakers compensate for attempts to deceive them.5
The fact that information provided by interest groups can help shape policy,
however, raises the possibility that an interest group may be tempted to mislead
policymakers when the information it possesses does not support the group’s
underlying policy preferences.6 Interest groups have occasionally attempted to
sway the balance in their favor by misrepresenting evidence to legislators, par-
ticularly regarding constituent preferences, although it is often unclear whether
these efforts were intentional or unintentional.7
When and to what extent interest groups willfully attempt to mislead leg-
islators remains an open empirical question,8 in large part because methods
of determining their intentions and the extent of the information that they
possess at any given time are limited. Moreover, the vast majority of litera-
Group Strategies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Alan Rosenthal, The Third House:
Lobbyists and Lobbying in the States (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2001); David Whiteman, Com-
munication in Congress: Members, Staff, and the Search for Information (Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 1995).
3 Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, American Business and Public
Policy (New York: Atherton, 1963), 353; Hedrick Smith, The Power Game: How Washington Works
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), 234; Whiteman, Communication in Congress, 45.
4 Lewis A. Dexter, How Organizations Are Represented in Washington (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1969); Berry, Interest Group Society, 119; Jan Potters and Frans Van Winden, ‘‘Lobbying
and Asymmetric Information,’’ Public Choice 74 (October 1992): 269–292; Schlozman and Tierney,
Organized Interests and American Democracy, 103.
5 Carol A. Bodensteiner, ‘‘Special Interest Group Coalitions: Ethical Standards for Broad-Based
Support Efforts,’’ Public Relations Review 23 (Spring 1997): 31–46; Randall L. Calvert, ‘‘The Value
of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice,’’ The Journal of Politics
47 (June 1985): 530–555; Susanne Lohmann, ‘‘A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative
Political Action,’’ American Political Science Review 87 (June 1993): 319–333.
6 Gary S. Becker, ‘‘A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,’’
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (August 1983): 371–400; Thomas P. Lyon and John W.
Maxwell, ‘‘Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy,’’ Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy 13 (Winter 2004): 561–597; Potters and Van Winden, ‘‘Lobbying and Asym-
metric Information,’’ 270; Samantha Sanchez, ‘‘How the West Is Won: Astroturf Lobbying and the
FWise Use_ Movement,’’ The American Prospect 25 (March–April 1996): 37–42; Wright, Interest
Groups and Congress, 106.
7 Scott Ainsworth, ‘‘Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence,’’ The Journal of
Politics 55 (February 1993): 41–56; E.E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1935), 274; Bodensteiner, ‘‘Special Interest Group Coalitions,’’
32; Lyon and Maxwell, ‘‘Astroturf,’’ 563–564; Sanchez, ‘‘How the West Is Won,’’ 41; Karl
Schriftgiesser, The Lobbyists: The Art and Business of Influencing Lawmakers (Boston, MA: Little
Brown, 1951), 71.
8 Potters and Van Winden, ‘‘Lobbying and Asymmetric Information,’’ 271; Wright, Interest Groups
and Congress, 113.
636 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
ture on interest group incentives relies on game theory rather than on empiri-
cal observations. In a few instances, however, firms have been required to
release internal records in conjunction with legal settlements. Our research
uses the most complete and publicly accessible of these records, tobacco in-
dustry documents released as part of civil actions on smoking and health, to
review the history of airline smoking bans in the United States. The availability
of these internal records offers an unprecedented opportunity to closely ex-
amine the inner workings of an economically and politically powerful inter-
est group in its efforts to influence policymaking.9 With these documents,
we are better able to understand the role of tobacco industry interest groups
in the policy process that led to the first federal restrictions of public smok-
ing, which, we suggest, provides an excellent case study of interest groups as
information providers.
This case study challenges key theoretical assumptions about interest
group lobbying. We propose that under certain circumstances, interest groups,
particularly firms, may present inaccurate information to policymakers about
public opinion despite the threat of exposure and the loss of credibility in
the long term. The expectation that firms may misrepresent evidence is con-
sistent with the very limited research regarding corporate lobbying, even
though most literature claims that it is unlikely that interest groups will at-
tempt to deceive policymakers.10 Moreover, any loss of credibility, if dis-
covered, may not necessarily compromise future political success. Although
the tobacco industry considers itself embattled, it has continued to be effec-
tive in preventing the passage of legislation and regulation aimed at restrict-
ing the use of its products. Our findings suggest that prevailing assumptions
about the validity of information provided by interest groups, especially firms,
should be reconsidered and that the current provisions of the 1995 Lobbying
Disclosure Act do not protect against interest group efforts to misrepresent
constituent preferences.
EXPECTATIONS ABOUT INTEREST GROUP INCENTIVES AND BEHAVIOR
Early work by E.E. Schattschneider argued that interest groups regularly
sought to misrepresent evidence and deceive policymakers about the extent
of popular support for their goals.11 Other research has posited that when
the political stakes are high, groups are more likely to attempt such decep-
tion.12 Even research that claims that groups have an incentive to misrepresent
9 Lisa Bero, ‘‘Implications of the Tobacco Industry Documents for Public Health and Policy,’’
Annual Review of Public Health 24 (January 2003): 267–288.
10 Becker, ‘‘Theory of Competition,’’ 393–394; Lyon and Maxwell, ‘‘Astroturf,’’ 562.
11 E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), 199.
12 Lohmann, ‘‘Signaling Model,’’ 321; Potters and Van Winden, ‘‘Lobbying and Asymmetric Infor-
mation,’’ 284; Wright, Interest Groups and Congress, 108.
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information, however, does not anticipate that deception is possible under
all circumstances.
Charles Lindblom and John Wright suggest that misrepresentation will be
ineffective when there are interest groups lobbying on both sides of an issue,
because the presentation of inconsistent information would reveal that one
group was not being completely forthcoming.13 To preserve their credibility,
rational interest groups should not attempt to deceive policymakers when
there are competing groups arguing the same issue.
One of the most critical pieces of information provided by interest groups
to legislators is the extent to which citizens in their districts support or oppose
policy changes. The extent of grassroots mobilization, because it requires the
same type of effort as electoral mobilization, is considered to be a key indi-
cator of constituent preferences.14 These campaigns, however, are judged by
their presumed spontaneity, and support or opposition solicited by organized
interest groups is far less meaningful to policymakers.15
We propose that interest groups will seek to deceive policymakers, despite
the risk of exposure, when the stakes are high16 and when accurate informa-
tion does not support their policy goals. Typically, businesses prefer not to
become involved in politics,17 but when regulation becomes threatening to
profits, firms will make efforts to influence policy. We propose that the deci-
sion to mislead is contextual, and that two conditions have to be met: the issue
is critical, and the group fears that it is losing. This theoretical modification
provides guidance about when and to what extent organizations may attempt to
mislead policymakers.
DATA AND METHODS
Our case study reviews strategies and tactics used by the tobacco industry
to influence the adoption of smoking restrictions on aircraft in the United
States, beginning with the petition to ban smoking on commercial aircraft
submitted to the Federal Aviation Administration by Ralph Nader in 1969,
and continuing through the implementation of the smoking ban in 1990. The
exact boundaries of the case study were established after preliminary analyses
of tobacco industry documents during data collection. As suggested by Harry
13 Charles E. Lindblom, ‘‘The FScience_ of Muddling Through,’’ Public Administration Review 19
(Spring 1959): 79–88; Wright, Interest Groups and Congress, 175.
14 Morris P. Fiorina, Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath
and Company, 1974); Wright, Interest Groups and Congress, 90; Bodensteiner, ‘‘Special Interest
Group Coalitions,’’ 32; Lohmann, ‘‘Signaling Model,’’ 322; Potters and Van Winden, ‘‘Lobbying and
Asymmetric Information,’’ 285.
15 Wright, Interest Groups and Congress, 91.
16 Ibid., 108; Potters and Van Winden, ‘‘Lobbying and Asymmetric Information,’’ 284.
17 Rosenthal, Third House.
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Eckstein18 and John Gerring,19 we use this single case study to build on existing
theory and to suggest parameters that predict when interest groups, particu-
larly firms, may resort to deception.
We conducted a comprehensive search of the Legacy Tobacco Docu-
ments Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu) and Tobacco Documents Online
(http://tobaccodocuments.org) to identify internal records describing efforts
to thwart the restriction of smoking on passenger aircraft. Search terms in-
cluded broad keywords such as airlines, aircraft, airplane, and cabin air as
well as the names of organizations, individuals, projects, files, Bates number
ranges, and other specific terms identified through snowball searching. (Bates
numbers are unique identifying numbers assigned by each producing party to
each page of tobacco industry documents when the documents were produced
in litigation.) Terms were deliberately wide-ranging and exhaustive to ensure
saturation. Searches took place between August 2003 and June 2005. All terms
used and their results were documented in an Excel spreadsheet. Searches
were repeated periodically through the remainder of 2005 in order to retrieve
any newly acquired records as well as to verify the reproducibility of our
data collection methods. The industry documents comprised our primary data
and included memoranda and correspondence, meeting minutes, proposals,
reports, publications, presentations, budgets, newsletters, and press releases.
We also included in our analysis documents produced by other organizations,
copies of government records, and news clippings and transcripts identified
in the tobacco industry’s files if they provided evidence of industry strategies
and tactics and/or the extent of their implementation.
In order to put the identified documents into their historical context as
well as to corroborate the degree to which the tobacco industry actually im-
plemented its plans, we supplemented our dataset with government records
from relevant congressional hearings, debates, and publications identified
by electronic searches of government websites (www.thomas.gov), LexisNexis,
and university law library databases. We also compiled Federal Register notices,
public commentary, hearings, and any meeting minutes from germane regula-
tory proceedings from the National Archives and Records Administration. Other
means of triangulating our data collection included searches of the Internet using
the search engine Google and social science, science, and news media databases
to identify any related research and documentation, especially from flight atten-
dant, aviation, and advocacy groups.
We identified several thousand pages of pertinent tobacco industry docu-
ments, public records, and related research and documentation. The majority
18 Harry Eckstein, ‘‘Case Study and Theory in Political Science’’ in Fred Greenstein and Nelson
Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1975), 94.
19 John Gerring, ‘‘What is a Case Study and What is it Good For?’’ American Political Science
Review 98 (May 2004): 341–354.
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of the industry documents came from the files of the Tobacco Institute (the
tobacco industry’s former lobbying and trade association), Philip Morris (now
Altria), and RJ Reynolds. We narrowed our in-depth review and synthesis to
approximately 150 documents that most comprehensively described tobacco
industry efforts to misrepresent evidence about constituent preferences, ex-
cluding redundant materials, all of which are available for public review online
through the University of California, San Francisco Legacy Tobacco Docu-
ments Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu). Our interpretative data analysis
involved iteratively reviewing the documents, categorizing the strategies and
tactics, and summarizing results. Findings were organized both categorically
and chronologically into four main areas: letter-writing campaigns, petition
drives, public opinion surveys, and smokers’ rights and other front groups.
AIRLINE SMOKING RESTRICTIONS BECOME A CRITICAL ISSUE FOR
THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY
We posit that one of two conditions that will lead interest groups to attempt
to deceive policymakers is the perception that the issue is critical to its sur-
vival. The tobacco industry developed its misrepresentation campaign after
concluding that maintaining smoking on airlines was key to maintaining the
social acceptability of smoking.20 Reduction in the social acceptability of smok-
ing was viewed by the industry as one of its greatest threats.21 The adoption of
smoking restrictions on passenger aircraft represents the first and remains one
of the few interventions by the federal government to protect nonsmokers from
the harms of secondhand smoke. Table 1 provides an account of the evolution
of the airline smoking policy process from the initial petitions to ban or segre-
gate smokers through the implementation of the smoking ban on most domes-
tic flights in 1990.
By the late 1970s, the tobacco industry felt that the assault on public smok-
ing by anti-smoking forces was a serious problem.22 The critical importance
of airline smoking restrictions was illustrated in a 1980 memo from James
Bowling, Phillip Morris senior vice president, to Horace Kornegay, Tobacco
Institute president.23 In this correspondence, which was generated in response
20 Anonymous. Philip Morris. 1988. An Action Plan for ETS in Europe and Adjacent Areas,
1989-1992. 10 Aug. Bates No. 2028364731/2028364743, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/
hkh56e00, 18 October 2004; James C. Bowling, [Memo to Horace Kornegay: Does this present an
opportunity?] 31 Dec. 1980. Bates No. 2023258261, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/pur24e00,
29 December 2004.
21 Stanton A. Glantz, John Slade, Lisa A. Bero, Peter Hanauer, and Deborah E. Barnes, The
Cigarette Papers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 391; Bero, ‘‘Implications of the
Tobacco Industry Documents.’’
22 William Kloepfer. 1984. Winter Meeting Presentation TI Board. Bates No. TI03150024/03150035,
accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/reu30c00, 20 September 2004.
23 Bowling.
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TABLE 1
A Chronology of Airlines and Smoking 1969–1990
1969
December Ralph Nader petitions the FAA and the CAB to ban smoking on airlines as annoying, unhealthy
for nonsmokers, and as a fire danger. John Banzhaf and ASH file a petition with the FAA seeking
separate smoking and nonsmoking sections aboard aircraft.
1973
May CAB requires domestic airlines to provide designated ‘‘no smoking’’ areas aboard aircraft for
reasons of consumer comfort and protection effective 1 July 1973.
1976
October Responding to an ASH petition to ban cigar and pipe smoking, CAB initiates a rulemaking
proceeding on a wide range of smoking issues.
1979
January CAB modifies the 1973 rules, requiring that airlines segregate cigar and pipe smokers; ban
smoking when the ventilation system is not fully functioning; ensure that nonsmokers are not
unreasonably burdened when a no-smoking section is sandwiched between two smoking
sections; accommodate all persons who wish to be seated in nonsmoking areas; and take
measures to enforce these rules. Docket 29044 is kept open for further comments.
May CAB invites comments on several proposals: ban smoking on flights of one hour or less; ban
smoking on small aircraft; ban cigar and pipe smoking; provide special seating arrangements
for passengers unusually susceptible to tobacco smoke; require partitions or buffer zones
between smoking and nonsmoking sections; and permit a waiver procedure for airlines that
wish to experiment with ways of segregating smokers and nonsmokers.
1981
February In a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking to its 16 May 1979 notice, CAB requests
commentary on two more options: a ban on all in-flight smoking or an elimination of the
regulation of smoking on passenger aircraft.
September CAB concludes the rulemaking begun in 1976 by dropping the 1979 modifications to the
smoking rule. It revises the rule by requiring airlines to guarantee a seat in the no smoking
section to every nonsmoker who meets the airline’s designated check-in deadline.
1983
September CAB issues supplemental proposals to ban smoking on short flights (one or two hours) and to
require additional special protections for those sensitive to smoke.
1984
June CAB adopts rules to ban smoking on small aircraft and to ban cigar and pipe smoking on
all flights.
1987
July House passes (198-193) an amendment to the DOT appropriations bill banning smoking on
flights of two hours or less.
October House Aviation Subcommittee hears testimony on smoking aboard airliners.
Senate passes a compromise amendment to the DOT appropriations bill banning smoking on
flights of 90 minutes or less for two years.
December The conference committee agrees to a compromise provision banning smoking on flights
of two hours or less for two years and a $2,000 fine for tampering with smoke detectors in
airliner lavatories.
1988
April Smoking ban on flights of two hours or less goes into effect as per Public Law 100–202.
1989
June House Aviation Subcommittee hears testimony on smoking aboard airliners.
July House Aviation Subcommittee marks up the bill introduced by Chairman Jim Oberstar,
modifying it to extend for two years the current two-hour ban. The bill is further amended in full
committee to make the ban permanent.
August House passes an amendment to the transportation appropriations bill that would make the
current ban of smoking on commercial flights of two hours or less permanent.
(Continued)
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to the 1981 Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) request for comment on either a
ban of all in-flight smoking or complete elimination of the smoker segregation
rule, Bowling stated:
As you know, I believe that the successful efforts of the anti’s in getting the
smoking/no-smoking rule established aboard aircraft was the single most effec-
tive thing in their effort to create and promote a social stigma to public smoking.
If this presents an opportunity to turn that one around—I think we should do
everything possible.
The industry was taken by surprise when in 1987, Representative Richard
Durbin (D-IL) succeeded in passing a provision to appropriations legisla-
tion on the House floor to ban smoking on flights of two hours or less.24 To
TABLE 1
Continued
September Senate adopts by voice vote the Lautenberg amendment to the transportation appropriations
bill banning smoking on all domestic flights.
October House–Senate conferees agree to ban smoking on all passenger flights within the continental
United States and all flights to Alaska and Hawaii lasting less than six hours.
1990
February Smoking ban (Public Law 101–164) on most scheduled U.S. domestic flights goes into effect.
ASH, Action on Smoking and Health; CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board; DOT, Department of Transportation;
FAA, Federal Aviation Administration.
Sources: 38 Fed Reg 12207. ‘‘Chapter II. Civil Aeronautics Board. Chapter A. Economic Regulations
[Regulation ER-800]. Part 252 Provision of Designated FNo-Smoking_ Areas Aboard Aircraft Operated by
Certificated Air Carriers.’’ (1973); 41 Fed Reg 44424. ‘‘Provision of Designated FNo-Smoking_ Areas Aboard
Aircraft Operated by Certificated Air Carriers. Proposed Rulemaking.’’ (1976); 44 Fed Reg 5075. Part 252 ‘‘Pro-
vision of Designated FNo-Smoking_ Areas Aboard Aircraft Operated by Certificated Air Carriers. Amendment
of Part. Final Rule.’’ (1979); 44 Fed Reg 29486. ‘‘Proposed Restrictions on Smoking Aboard Aircraft: Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking.’’ (1979); 46 Fed Reg 11827. ‘‘Smoking Aboard Aircraft. Supplemental Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking.’’ (1981); 46 Fed Reg 45934. ‘‘Smoking Aboard Aircraft.’’ (1981); 48 Fed Reg 43341. ‘‘Smok-
ing Aboard Aircraft. Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.’’ (1983); 49 Fed Reg 25408. ‘‘Smoking
Aboard Aircraft.’’ (1984); ‘‘Petition for Promulgation of a Rule Requiring Separation of Smoking and Non-smoking
Passengers on All Commercial Domestic Air Carriers.’’ (1969); Department of Transportation and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act of 1988, 100th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 133, no. 115 (1987): H 6167;
Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, 101st Cong., 1st sess., Con-
gressional Record 135, no. 108 (1989): H 5005; Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appro-
priations Act of 1990 (1990): H 3015; Department of Transportation Appropriations Act, 100th Cong., 1st sess.,
Congressional Record 133, no. 171 (1987): S 15423; Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Pro-
grams Appropriations Act of 1988, Public Law 100–102 (December 22, 1987): H 395; Edmund Preston. FAA
Historical Chronology Civil Aviation and the Federal Government 1926–1996 (Washington DC: Department
of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Public Affairs, 1998); House Subcommittee on
Aviation of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft, 100th
Cong., 1st sess., 1987; House Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Public Works and Transporta-
tion, To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989.
24 Anonymous. 1988. Smoking Aboard Airliners: A Strategic Plan. 22 Apr. Bates No. TI07670374/
07670398, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wwy30c00, 17 March 2005; Department of
Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1988, 100th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional
Record 133, no. 115 (1987): H 6167.
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stop the legislation, the industry used direct one-on-one lobbying and grass-
roots mobilization.25 Efforts to demonstrate public opinion against a ban in-
cluded the formation by the tobacco industry of the Committee for Airline
Passengers’ Rights.26
Even before the temporary two-year smoking ban on flights of two hours
or less went into effect in April 1988, the Tobacco Institute developed a 25-
page action plan and an airline smoking program with a budget of over $2.5
million to ensure that the law would expire.27 The plan had three objectives:
To ensure that the two-hour ban sunsets as scheduled on April 22, 1990. To per-
suade congressional and DOT [Department of Transportation] decision makers
that the issues to be confronted are cabin air quality and ventilation. To persuade
congressional and DOT decision-makers and airlines that smokers expect to be
accommodated and that all parties should fight for restoration of a more reason-
able system.28
By 1989, executives at the Tobacco Institute described airline smoking
as the industry’s ‘‘most persistent and intractable issue’’29 and one of the in-
dustry’s ‘‘most difficult challenges in Congress.’’30 Despite the engagement of
an army of tobacco industry and third-party lobbyists31 and the help of influ-
ential allies in Congress, the industry was unable to stop the adoption of
legislation permanently banning smoking on most domestic flights. Even be-
fore final passage of the ban, the Tobacco Institute acknowledged defeat by
eliminating the airline smoking program from its 1990 budget proposal, aban-
25 Anonymous. 1987. Airline Smoking Presentation at Nordic NMA ETS Working Group Helsinki,
December 10, 1987. 9 Dec. Bates No. 2501330521/2501330536, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.
edu/tid/cje32e00, 10 March 2005.
26 Peter G. Sparber. 1987. 15 Oct. Bates No. TI07670456, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/
tid/yvy30c00, 10 March 2005.
27 Peter G. Sparber. 1988. Enclosed Attached Review Plan for Smoking Restrictions. Smoking
Aboard Airlines: A Strategic Plan. Appendix A Thru E. 25 Feb. Bates No. TI00450004/00450022, ac-
cessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lum30c00, 16 March 2005; Anonymous, Smoking Aboard
Airliners: A Strategic Plan.
28 Anonymous, Smoking Aboard Airliners: A Strategic Plan.
29 John Lyons. Tobacco Institute. 1989. 16 Aug. Bates No. TI01140210/01140213, accessed at http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ybp30c00, 13 April 2005.
30 Samuel D. Chilcote. Tobacco Institute. 1989. 28 Sep. Bates No. 508088599/508088599, accessed
at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qls31d00, 15 April 2005.
31 Ibid., 8 Aug. Bates No. TNWL0034910, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rmk07d00,
13 April 2005; Daniel A. Najjar. 1989. 21 Aug. Bates No. 507641135/507641136, accessed at http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xbp61d00, 13 April 2005; Daniel C. Nelson. 1989. Federal Contacts–Airline
Smoking Ban. 29 Aug. Bates No. TI00441729/00441730, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/
ivm30c00, 13 April 2005; Walter Woodson. 1989. Airline Contacts During Recess. 8 Aug. Bates No.
TI00442323, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_indexed/TI00442323.html, 13 April 2005;
Walter Woodson. 1989. Airline Smoking Ban Contact Program. 11 Aug. Bates No. TI00441284/00441288,
accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_indexed/TI00441284.html, 13 April 2005.
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doning efforts to generate favorable public opinion research, and withdraw-
ing funding for the industry-sponsored group, the Smokers’ Rights Alliance.32
MISREPRESENTING CONSTITUENT PREFERENCES
Although the tobacco industry used a number of strategies to prevent pas-
sage of airline smoking restrictions, we focus on attempts to misrepresent
constituent preferences, since this information can be critical in establishing
legislative policy positions. The following sections describe the industry’s in-
ternal discussion about its attempts to mischaracterize public support through
letter-writing campaigns, petition drives, public opinion surveys, and smokers’
rights and other front groups.
Letter-writing Campaigns
The tobacco industry attempted to hide its involvement in letter-writing cam-
paigns throughout the airline smoking policy process. Letters were generated
by the industry’s own employees and related individuals and organizations
(for example, the Tobacco Institute, tobacco companies and associations,
wholesalers, distributors, advertisers, law firms, tobacco farmers and unions,
and subsidiaries).33 Figure 1 shows excerpts of examples of the various covert
32 Susan Stuntz. 1989. 21 Sep. Bates No. TI17681799/17681804, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.
org/nysa_ti_m1/TI17681799.html, 14 September 2005; Tobacco Institute. 1989. Public Affairs Manage-
ment Plan Progress Report October 1989. Oct. Bates No. TI09911505/09911542, accessed at http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rga40c00, 15 April 2005.
33 Coordinating Board of Tobacco. Jack Beaty. 1972. The Civil Aeronautics Board Has Proposed
a Ruling That Would Require All Airlines to Segregate Smokers from Other Passengers. 4 Dec. Bates
No. 518152656/518152657, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zso61d00, 9 November 2004;
Jeb Lee. 1972. Proposed CAB Ruling. 27 Nov. Bates No. 1003057843/1003057844, accessed at http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/mcw64e00, 9 November 2004; John C.B. Ehringhaus. Tobacco Institute.
1976. The Civil Aeronautics Board Has Formally Proposed to Outlaw Pipe and Cigar Smoking on
Airlines—and Might Even Prohibit All Smoking During Flights. 19 Oct. Bates No. 500002108, ac-
cessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/viu31d00, 19 November 2004; Rene Rondou. Tobacco
Workers International Union. 1976. Copy of Letter Sent to CAB. Request to All U.S. TWIU Local
Union Members to Send a Similar Letter on a Personal Basis. 28 Oct. Bates No. TI04341735, accessed
at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/bkv30c00, 19 November 2004; Stanley S. Scott. Philip Morris. 1979.
9 Aug. Bates No. 2023022551/2023022552, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/acx36e00,
21 December 2004; Alfred M. Pollard. Tobacco Institute. 1981. Action Plan on CAB Regulations on
Smoking. 4 Mar. Bates No. TI36310091/36310096, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_
m1/TI36310091.html, 21 December 2004; Paul Serber. Tobacco Institute. 1983. 10 Aug. Bates No.
TI12091337/12091346, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI12091337.html, 31 Jan-
uary 2005; Walter Woodson. 1987. FET Airline Bans, State Efforts During the Recess. 6 Aug. Bates
No. TI09052656/09052665, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI09052656.html,
31 January 2005; David Laufer. Philip Morris. 1987. Airline Smoking Ban Mobilizations. 20 July.
Bates No. TI09052542/09052547, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI09052542.
html, 9 March 2005; Anonymous. 1989. Airline Smoking Ban Response Cards Received. Bates No.
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FIGURE 1
Examples of Covert Letter-writing Requests from Tobacco Industry Documents
Sources: James C. Bowling. Philip Morris. 1983. 9 Aug. Bates No. 2500165602/2500165603. http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cfi22d00. J. A. Broughton. 1976. 25 Oct. Bates No. 680086604. http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rbw04f00. Committee for Airline Passengers Rights. 1987. No on Airline
Smoking Bans Fact Sheet. 20 Nov. Bates No. TI11153154/11153156. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/
ulh40c00. Arthur J. Stevens. 1972. 13 Nov. Bates No. 2025015096. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/
raa56e00. Tobacco Action Network. Tobacco Institute. 1980. CAB Action Request. 22 May. Bates
No. TI21441332/21441334. http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI21441332.html.
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letter-writing requests found in the tobacco industry’s files, from the first
proceeding to establish smoking sections in 1972 through the congressional
adoption of a smoking ban in 1987. Requests repeatedly indicated that any
association with the tobacco industry be hidden. The industry was also aware
that the correspondence needed to be sufficiently varied to ‘‘avoid the ap-
pearance of a tightly organized campaign.’’34
The industry’s efforts to conceal its involvement were not always success-
ful. At least one tobacco company letter drive was uncovered and reported
in the major press during the CAB’s first rulemaking in 1972.35 Despite the
industry’s letter-writing efforts in this case, most of the 4,500 letters received by
the agency were in favor of the proposed rule (no further breakdown provided).36
The tobacco industry continued to solicit letters in response to each attempt
to tighten the smoking rules on aircraft. Important to the industry’s future
successes at producing favorable comment was the formation of the Tobacco
Action Network (TAN) by the Tobacco Institute in 1977. Coordinated through
the Tobacco Institute’s state activities division and consisting predominantly
of tobacco-related individuals,37 TAN enrollees were first mobilized to write
letters in opposition to further regulations proposed by the CAB in 1979.38
The TAN response to the proceeding was applauded by the industry in one of
the organization’s monthly newsletters:
Although letters to the CAB were running as high as 50 to 1 against the smokers
at the beginning of the Campaign, the final tally, after the August 20 deadline,
showed a ratio of 2 to 1 against further restrictions.39
TI00441716/00441725, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/mvm30c00, 13 April 2005; Tobacco
Institute. 1988. Public Affairs Management Plan Progress Report. Aug. Bates No. TIDN0018350/0018388,
accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fyh91f00, 17 March 2005.
34 Dennis Durden. 1976. Here’s My Draft of What I’d Suggest Bill Hobbs Send. 3 Nov. Bates No.
500799117/500799118, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xzf35a00, 19 November 2004.
35 Jack Anderson. United Feature Syndicate and The Washington Post. 1973. Lorillard Inspires
Pro-smoking Mail. 19 Jan. Bates No. 03742088/03742089, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/
chx61e00, 9 November 2004; Jack Anderson. Miami Herald. 1973. Ghosting for Lorrilard. Pro-
smoking Letters ‘‘Inspired.’’ 19 Jan. Bates No. 503682687/503682687, accessed at http://legacy.library.
ucsf.edu/tid/vst31d00, 9 November 2004.
36 38 Fed Reg 12207, ‘‘Chapter II. Civil Aeronautics Board. Chapter A. Economic Regulations
[Regulation ER-800]. Part 252 Provision of Designated ‘‘No-Smoking’’ Areas Aboard Aircraft Oper-
ated by Certificated Air Carriers.’’ (1973).
37 Organization Resources Counselors, Inc. 1981. The Tobacco Institute. A Study of the Tobacco
Action Network. Mar. Bates No. 03673008/03673077, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/
oyf71e00, 17 May 2005.
38 TAN. Tobacco Action Network. 1979. TAN National UPDATE. Jun. Bates No. TIFL0063746/
0063751, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qsq02f00, 21 December 2004.
39 TAN. Tobacco Action Network. 1979. TAN National UPDATE, Volume 1, Number 2 CAB Cam-
paign Called Success. Nov. Bates No. TI22620786/22620791, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/
nysa_ti_m1/TI22620786.html, 21 December 2004.
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Monitoring of letter counts in the CAB docket by the tobacco industry in
subsequent proceedings showed that before the initiation of industry-driven
letter-writing campaigns, there was overwhelming support of the agency’s pro-
posals for further restrictions. One surveillance report from July 1983 stated:
While at C.A.B., I reviewed some of the 800 pieces received in response to
D. 41431. All but one letter was in favor of imposing restrictions on smoking.40
Further follow-up of the docket contents demonstrated the industry’s
overwhelming success in generating comments favorable to its position. To-
bacco Institute correspondence from September 1983 indicated that the CAB
received a total of 3,700 letters, with 1,700 against further restrictions.41 By
November, the letters ran 64 percent against the proposed regulations.42 How-
ever, the industry sought to make the letter count match the results of its
recently released public opinion survey, which claimed that approximately 80
percent of the public supported its position (discussed below).43 A November
1983 memo from William Kloepfer, Tobacco Institute senior vice president, to
its staff declared:
But this is not enough. As we measured public opinion, it’s 80-20 against. The
docket ratio should be the same and that is our goal.’’44
The Institute nearly reached its objective. Of the approximately 20,000
individual letters submitted to CAB, 14,399 (72 percent) opposed any further
restrictions on smoking while 5,457 (27 percent) favored further restrictions.45
The industry continued its mobilization efforts and boasted of success
in generating letters, mailgrams, and phone calls to key legislators, the DOT,
and airline executives when the airline smoking issue emerged in Con-
gress.46 Despite its efforts to conceal its involvement, members of Congress
40 Adele Abrams. 1983. C.A.B. Action on Docket #29044 Public Response to D. 41431. 27 Jul. Bates
No. TI12470636/12470638, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dtm40c00, 25 January 2005.
41 J. Kendrick Wells. 1983. 22 Sep. Bates No. 680011631/680011634, accessed at http://legacy.
library.ucsf.edu/tid/ayc24f00, 25 January 2005.
42 William Kloepfer. 1983. Civil Aeronautics Board: Update. 4 Nov. Bates No. 690148318/
690148331, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/yhq93f00, 1 February 2005.
43 Tarrance & Associates. 1983. Airline Smoking Study. A Report Prepared for the Tobacco Insti-
tute. Sep. Bates No. TI10581643/10581654, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/mug40c00,
21 April 2005.
44 Kloepfer. Civil Aeronautics Board: Update (emphasis in original).
45 Gregory R. Scott. Philip Morris. 1984. February 14-15 CAB Oral Argument Proceedings on Pro-
posed Revisions to Smoking Rules. 15 Feb. Bates No. 2047363245/2047363251, accessed at http://legacy.
library.ucsf.edu/tid/prz62e00, 3 February 2005; 49 Fed Reg 25408, ‘‘Smoking Aboard Aircraft’’ (1984).
46 Anonymous, Smoking Aboard Airliners: A Strategic Plan; Laufer. Airline Smoking Ban Mobi-
lizations; Walter V. Robinson. Boston Globe. 1987. Smoky Flight Gave Him a Clear Purpose. 24 Dec.
Bates No. TITX0034759, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ouw32f00, 10 March 2005;
Woodson. FET Airline Bans, State Efforts; Anonymous. 1988. Lyons’ Report to the Communications
Committee on the Status of Airline Smoking Matters. Bates No. TIMN0014765/0014770, accessed
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were aware that the flood of communications had been generated by the
tobacco lobby.47
Petition Drives
To offset letters to the CAB supporting smoking restrictions on aircraft, the
tobacco industry developed a plan to obtain support from airline travelers.48
The Tobacco Institute and Philip Morris hired Donnelley Marketing to con-
duct a nationwide airport petition drive in response to the CAB’s first attempt
to strengthen its smoking rule in 1976.49 At a cost of approximately $190,000,50
about 133,000 signatures were obtained and submitted by the Tobacco Insti-
tute, along with its supplemental comments, to the CAB.51 Despite difficulties
in obtaining access to several major airports, the industry claimed its petition
drive was a success.52 At a press conference, president Kornegay stated:
This dramatic response of airline passengers to the petition drive belies the sug-
gestion ... that a substantial proportion of ordinary airline passengers support
further restriction on smoking.53
Kornegay did not reveal that the petitions were supplemented with sig-
natures from within the tobacco industry and its subsidiaries.54 He noted in an
at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tio03f00, 15 March 2005; Anonymous. Airline Smoking Ban Re-
sponse Cards Received; Tobacco Institute. Public Affairs Management Plan Progress Report.
47 House Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation,
To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987. W.V. Robinson. Boston Globe. 1989.
Tobacco Lobby Pervades Congress Article # 2. 24 Sep. Bates No. TI30819602/30819606, accessed at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tlp76d00, 4 October 2004.
48 James S. Dowdell. 1977. CAB/EAL. 18 Aug. Bates No. 500002012/500002014, accessed at http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lij99d00, 21 December 2004.
49 Edward A. Grefe. Philip Morris. 1976. 14 Dec. Bates No. 2025014956/2025014959, accessed at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/joa81f00, 19 November 2004; Edward A. Grefe. Philip Morris. 1976.
Preliminary Test Results of Petition Drive. 31 Dec. Bates No. 2024989082/2024989084, accessed at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zjy46e00, 30 November 2004.
50 Grefe. Preliminary Test Results of Petition Drive.
51 CAB and Associate General Counsel of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), Memorandum:
Summary of comments on EDR-306, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking with respect to Part 252,
‘‘Provision of Designated FNo-Smoking_ Areas Aboard Aircraft Operated by Certificated Air Car-
riers.’’ Docket 29044. From the National Archives and Records Administration. April 20. See also
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/frg24e00 1977.
52 Tobacco Institute. 1977. Press release. 21 Jan. Bates No. TIMN0120658/0120659, accessed at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fwg92f00, 30 November 2004; Horace R. Kornegay. 1977. CAB Peti-
tion Canvass Results. 21 Jan. Bates No. 2024989052/2024989056, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.
edu/tid/krg24e00, 30 November 2004.
53 Tobacco Institute. Press release.
54 Horace R. Kornegay. 1977. 14 Jan. Bates No. 03741908, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/
tid/jfx61e00, 30 November 2004; William D. Hobbs. 1977. 19 Jan. Bates No. 505197537/505197537, ac-
cessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jvt25d00, 30 November 2004.
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internal memo that it was essential that any petitions circulated amongst
employees be delivered to the CAB within a time frame that would ‘‘insure
[sic] that the integrity of the signatures obtained at the airports is main-
tained.’’55 Using a short time frame allowed the industry to present its peti-
tions as being signed exclusively by airline passengers. The CAB docket also
contained evidence that some signatures may have been falsified.56
The Tobacco Institute conducted a second nationwide airport petition
drive in 1983 in response to the CAB’s proposals to ban smoking on small
aircraft and short flights.57 The Tobacco Institute filed more than 180,000
signatures with the CAB58 and again did not disclose that the petitions had
also been distributed among tobacco industry employees.59 One industry docu-
ment revealed that the Philip Morris sales division had collected more than
50,000 of the signatures.60 Private citizens also filed complaints about petition
gatherers who did not always disclose tobacco industry sponsorship or the nature
of the petition.61 We found no evidence of any response to these complaints.
Public Opinion Surveys
The tobacco industry conducted a series of public opinion surveys on airline
smoking restrictions and selectively publicized only findings that supported
its position. The first opinion poll was conducted in 1983 for the Tobacco Insti-
tute by Tarrance and Associates.62 The telephone survey found that 83 percent
of 1,000 U.S. air travelers felt that the arrangement of separate seating for
smokers and nonsmokers ‘‘works pretty well in making all passengers com-
55 Kornegay (emphasis in original).
56 Lawrence Aves, Letter to Iowa Congressman Charles Grassley regarding falsified petition signa-
ture. Correspondence file. Docket #29044, National Archives and Records Administration, 28 April 1977.
57 Anonymous. 1983. The C.A.B. Proposal: A Program Concept. 18 Sep. Bates No. 2024078565/
2024078570, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/afr14e00, 25 January 2005; William Kloepfer.
Tobacco Institute. 1983. Response to CAB’s Smoking Rule Proposals. 30 Sep. Bates No. 01344941/
01344943, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xww81e00, 26 January 2005.
58 Tobacco Institute and Horace R. Kornegay, Reply Comments of the Tobacco Institute to the
Civil Aeronautics Board. Docket No. 41431 EDR-461 and EDR-461B, 27 Dec. 1983.
59 Stan Boman. Tobacco Institute. 1983. 3 Nov. Bates No. TIOK0029627, accessed at http://legacy.
library.ucsf.edu/tid/jau91f00, 1 February 2005; Bill Toohey. Tobacco Institute. 1983. Merryman
PUBSAT Interview on CAB Situation. 11 Nov. Bates No. TI12302213/12302221, accessed at http://
tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI12302213.html, 1 February 2005; Charles G. Hord. 1983. Civil
Aeronautics Board. 4 Nov. Bates No. TNWL0029111, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/
hzn07d00, 1 February 2005.
60 Anonymous. 1984. Civil Aeronautics Board. Nov. Bates No. 2025434656/2025434658, accessed at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/swr25e00, 2 February 2005.
61 Marc Matre. 1983. CAB-Smoking Rulemaking. 23 Nov. Bates No. TI00451699/00451703, accessed
at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_indexed/TI00451699.html, 2 February 2005; B.G. Hall, CAB-
Smoking Rulemaking (Washington DC: National Archives and Records Administration. Docket No.
41431, 1983).
62 Tarrance & Associates. Airline Smoking Study.
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fortable.’’ The industry did not disclose, however, the results of its pilot study
(300 respondents).63 A September 1983 memorandum from Kloepfer to the
Institute’s president disclosed these preliminary findings and stated:
On our pilot survey of airline passengers, we do not have reassuring results.
While the great majority feel that present arrangements are OK, their number
diminishes the moment they are told of possible new regulations. We came out
50% for and 38% against the prohibition of smoking on planes with fewer than
60 seats. We came out 46-47 on the two hours or less prohibition.64
Specific questions on proposed regulations or legislation as used in the
pilot survey do not appear in the full study or in any subsequent publicly
disclosed surveys sponsored by the industry. Furthermore, the 1983 final report
falsely stated in its overview that ‘‘the Tobacco Institute was unaware of any
significant public demand from air travelers to change the present arrange-
ment.’’65 When the Tobacco Institute repeated the survey in 1985, it found that
82 percent indicated that they approved the current arrangement of seg-
regating smokers and nonsmokers (1,000 respondents).66 Data from these polls
were used repeatedly in public commentary and hearing testimony to argue
that there was no public support for further restricting smoking on aircraft.67
Philip Morris also studied air travelers’ attitudes toward smoking restrictions
and found results consistent with the Tobacco Institute’s pilot study. The un-
publicized survey showed that 55 percent of 101 nonsmokers and 13 percent
of 99 smokers strongly approved of a smoking ban on all airplane flights.68
In 1987, the Tobacco Institute worked with the airline pilots association
to survey passenger attitudes on airline issues including smoking.69 In this
survey, 87 percent indicated that the ‘‘practice of separating smoking and
nonsmoking passengers is a reasonable policy that respects the rights of each’’
(1,000 respondents). The Tobacco Institute claimed not to have been involved
63 William Kloepfer. 1983. 6 Sep. Bates No. TI12302457/12302461, accessed at http://tobacco
documents.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI12302457.html, 21 April 2005; Richard E. Ryan. Tarrance & Associates.
1983. 29 Aug. Bates No. TI12302453/12302456, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/
TI12302453.html, 21 April 2005; Wells.
64 Kloepfer (emphasis in original).
65 Tarrance & Associates. Airline Smoking Study.
66 Tarrance & Associates. 1985. 1985 Airline Smoking Study Prepared for the Tobacco Institute. Apr.
Bates No. 85672258/85672296, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tzl31e00, 21 April 2005.
67 Tobacco Institute and Horace R. Kornegay, Comments of the Tobacco Institute on Proposed
Amendments to Regulations Governing Smoking Aboard Commercial Aircraft. Submitted to the
Civil Aeronautics Board. Docket No. 41431 EDR-461 and EDR 461B, 7 Nov 1983; Tobacco Institute
and Kornegay, Reply Comments of the Tobacco Institute; To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft.
68 Cheryl L. McKay. Philip Morris. 1985. Sidestream Smoke Attitude Survey. 15 May. Bates No.
2021568757/2021568789, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/tmb68e00, 21 April 2005.
69 Anonymous. 1989. Fact: Airline Passengers Were Satisfied with the System of Providing Separate
Sections for Smokers and Nonsmokers. Bates No. TI04091620, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.
edu/tid/ttu30c00, 25 April 2005.
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with this research in its testimony to Congress.70 Internal documents show,
however, that the Tobacco Institute paid for the study and developed the ques-
tionnaire with the airline pilots association.71
Three other public opinion polls conducted in 1987, independent of the
tobacco industry, showed broad support for airline smoking bans. At the 1987
House Aviation Subcommittee hearing on airline smoking, a representative of the
International Foundation of Airline Passenger Associations presented data from
its worldwide survey of passengers’ attitudes toward smoking on aircraft.72 The
study found that 60 percent of all U.S. passengers supported a smoking ban on
flights up to two hours and that 48 percent favored a ban on all flights (7,200
respondents).73 Only 17 percent indicated that they preferred dividing the aircraft
cabin between smokers and nonsmokers. A survey sponsored by the American
Medical Association showed that 67 percent of its 1,500 study participants in-
dicated that smoking should not be allowed on aircraft.74 The American Asso-
ciation of Respiratory Care (AARC) conducted a study among over 33,000
airline passengers and found that 64 percent favored a smoking ban on all flights.75
A second AARC poll conducted in 1989 found that 84 percent ap-
proved the ban on flights of two hours or less and 67 percent indicated that
the ban should be extended to all flights (27,667 respondents).76 In a press
release, the Tobacco Institute claimed that this study was flawed and stated that
the ‘‘AARC Ffindings_ are not consistent with other more reliable measures of
public opinion.’’77 The AARC responded to the claims by challenging the Insti-
tute to work cooperatively to conduct another poll. The offer was declined.78
70 To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft.
71 William Kloepfer. 1987. Action on Airline Smoking Ban. 30 Dec. Bates No. TI07670542/07670544,
accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/svy30c00, 10 March 2005; Susan Stuntz. 1987. Issues for
Discussion with Wendell Ford. 12 Mar. Bates No. TI07670552/07670553, accessed at http://legacy.
library.ucsf.edu/tid/mvy30c00, 28 February 2005.
72 To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft; Geoffrey Lipman. International Foundation of Airline
Passengers Associations (IFAPA). 1987. Comments of the International Foundation of Airline Pas-
sengers Associations before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Public Works
and Transportation, U.S. House of Representatives Legislation to Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft. 7 Oct.
Bates No. TI12030338/12030342, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dzk40c00, 21 April 2005.
73 To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft.
74 Kane Parsons & Associates, Health Care Issues (American Medical Association, 1987).
75 Sherry Milligan. American Association for Respiratory Care. 1987. AARC Airline Smoking
Survey. Airline Passengers Prefer Smoke Free Environment. Sep. Bates No. TI07071333/07071342,
accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI07071333.html, 21 April 2005.
76 American Association for Respiratory Care. 1989. Public Attitudes About Smoking on Airlines.
A Survey Conducted by the American Association for Respiratory Care. 20 Jun. Bates No. 87649025/
87649056, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rgs21e00, 25 April 2005.
77 Tobacco Institute. 1989. Public Opinion Poll About Smoking on Airlines Not Supported by Other
Opinion Measures. 20 Jun. Bates No. 2040852208, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/
rlm52e00, 25 April 2005.
78 Tobacco Institute. 1989. Public Affairs Management Plan Progress Report June 1989. Jun. Bates
No. TIMN0296697/0296730, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fmp62f00, 22 March 2005.
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By 1989, the Tobacco Institute privately conceded that public opinion
favored bans on airline smoking.79 A May 1989 memo from John Lyons, leader
of the Smokers’ Rights Alliance, states:
There is $50,000 in the airline budget for a public opinion survey in 1989. I do
not anticipate conducting this survey. (Crafting useful questions would be ex-
tremely difficult, and other surveys in the last 12 months suggest we would not like
the results).80
In a July 1989 progress report on the airline smoking strategy, Lyons
confirmed that public opinion research among voters in tobacco states would
not be undertaken, owing to the apparent acceptance of the two-hour ban.
He reported findings from a survey conducted by a Tennessee congressman
in which 70 percent of constituents participating in the poll supported a total
in-flight smoking ban.81 Publicly, however, the Tobacco Institute maintained
that the general public did not support banning smoking on aircraft. In testi-
mony before Congress in 1989, Tobacco Institute spokesman Charles Whitley
repeated the industry’s claim that the majority of Americans did not support
the prohibition of smoking on aircraft.82
Smokers’ Rights and Other Front Groups
Committee for Airline Passengers’ Rights. In response to Senate passage of
an amendment banning smoking on flights of 90 minutes or less in late 1987,
the tobacco industry formed the Committee for Airline Passengers’ Rights, an
organization ‘‘made up of smokers and tobacco industry personnel.’’83 The
group was first developed and deployed in New Jersey with the intention of
influencing Senator Frank Lautenberg, a major proponent of the airline smok-
ing ban.84 David Goldfarb, executive director of the Tobacco Distributors
79 John Lyons. 1989. Economics of the Airline Smoking Ban. 16 May. Bates No. TI17682612/
17682613, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI17682612.html, 22 March 2005;
John Lyons. 1989. Airlines. Jul. Bates No. TI01140253/01140282, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.
edu/tid/ebp30c00, 23 March 2005.
80 Lyons. Economics of the Airline Smoking Ban.
81 Lyons. Airlines.
82 To Ban Smoking on Airline Aircraft.
83 Sparber; Peter G. Sparber. 1987. Progress on ‘‘Airline Passengers Rights’’ Organizations. 20 Oct.
Bates No. TI07670427, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/nwy30c00, 10 December 2004;
Peter G. Sparber. 1987. Public Affairs Management Plan Progress Report November 1987. Nov. Bates
No. TIFL0536007/0536045, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wpk02f00, 10 March 2005;
Anonymous, Smoking Aboard Airliners: A Strategic Plan.
84 Samuel D. Chilcote. Tobacco Institute. 1987. Importance of Impacting Senator Lautenberg on
the Airline Issue. 1 Dec. Bates No. TI11153152, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wlh40c00,
10 December 2004; Committee for Airline Passengers Rights. 1987. No on Airline Smoking Bans
Fact Sheet. 20 Nov. Bates No. TI11153154/11153156, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/
ulh40c00, 10 March 2005.
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Association of New Jersey, was appointed as the Committee’s chairman.85 The
front group’s main function was to mobilize individuals to write and express
their views to Senator Lautenberg so that he would ‘‘know there is a strong
group of New Jerseyeans who disagree with his views on tobacco issues’’86
(see Figure 1). In this covert campaign, private citizens who received the
group’s ‘‘Fact Sheets’’ and letter-writing requests were unaware that there was
no affiliation with an actual airline passengers’ organization.
Smokers’ Rights Alliance. The general consensus among the Tobacco Insti-
tute’s airline working group in early 1988 was that mobilization of smokers
was needed to exert pressure on policymakers and airlines to ensure sunset of
the smoking ban.87 A March 1988 memo summarizing the proposed airline
strategy from the group’s leader, John Lyons, to Tobacco Institute executive
Peter Sparber stated:
Smokers are an unorganized political constituency, but unless there is an outcry
among smokers, there will be no reason, no context, to repeal the ban or allow it
to sunset.88
To achieve this aim, the Tobacco Institute coordinated, publicized, and
funded the media events and other public relations activities of Dave Brenton
and the Smokers’ Rights Alliance.89 Based in Arizona,90 with about 700 mem-
bers,91 the group claimed to operate on membership dues and private dona-
tions, including ‘‘some in-kind assistance’’ from the Tobacco Institute.92 Brenton
was available on a full-time basis for activities pertaining to the airline smoking
issue and would receive $5,000/month compensation.93 In addition, the To-
bacco Institute provided informational materials and funded various public
85 Chilcote. Importance of Impacting Senator Lautenberg.
86 Committee for Airline Passengers Rights. No on Airline Smoking Bans Fact Sheet.
87 John Lyons. 1988. Views of Prospective Members of the Airline Working Group. 27 Jan. Bates
No. TI01132303/01132310, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_indexed/TI01132303.
html, 15 March 2005; John Lyons. 1988. Summary of the Proposed Airline Strategy. 10 Mar. Bates
No. TI07670369/07670370, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ywy30c00, 16 March 2005.
88 Lyons. Summary of the Proposed Airline Strategy.
89 Samuel D. Chilcote. 1988. 14 Apr. Bates No. TI11391376/11391379, accessed at http://legacy.
library.ucsf.edu/tid/tyi40c00, 16 March 2005; Tobacco Institute. Public Affairs Management Plan
Progress Report.
90 David W. Brenton. 1988. Tobacco Observer Volume 13, No. 1. Mar. Bates No. TI07830356/
07830359, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/iaz30c00, 26 May 2005.
91 John Lyons. 1988. Smokers Rights Alliances Airport Activities. 23 May. Bates No. TI01571335/
01571339, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qpr30c00, 16 March 2005.
92 Richard Durbin. Christian Science Monitor. 1989. The Tobacco Industry’s Smoke Screen. 16 Aug.
Bates No. TI01140241, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/lbp30c00, 23 March 2005.
93 William Kloepfer. Tobacco Institute. 1988. 16 Mar. Bates No. TI44811425/44811426, accessed
at http://tobaccodocuments.org/nysa_ti_m1/TI44811425.html, 16 March 2005.
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relations activities budgeted at about $80,000.94 Included among Smokers’
Rights Alliance activities were television and radio appearances, information
booths, petition drives, and demonstrations at airports across the country. How-
ever, these demonstrations consisted of tobacco industry personnel picketing in
the various locales rather than outraged smokers, as advertised.95
The relationship between the tobacco industry and the Smokers’ Rights
Alliance was exposed in the Congressional Record and in the print media in
1989.96 Funding of the group was suspended when the Tobacco Institute
eliminated its airline smoking program in late 1989.97
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This analysis of internal documents and public records demonstrates the to-
bacco industry’s continued attempts to mislead policymakers regarding public
support for airline smoking restrictions, and reviews the circumstances that led
the industry to pursue this strategy. As hypothesized, this study shows that
there are circumstances under which firms may present inaccurate information
about constituent preferences. By implication, it also suggests what might lead
organizations in similar situations to engage in comparable behavior. The find-
ings further imply that this misrepresentation does not always lead to a long-
term loss of organizational effectiveness.
Although the tobacco industry was ultimately unsuccessful in preventing
a smoking ban on passenger aircraft, it managed to delay effective regulation
for nearly two decades. Only a few of the industry’s strategies to mislead policy-
makers were exposed, mostly near the end of the 20-year policy process (for
example, letter-writing campaigns and the sponsorship of the Smokers’ Rights
Alliance). More importantly, the extent of industry grassroots mobilization ef-
forts was never revealed. Tobacco industry research on docket contents during
several regulatory proceedings demonstrated that in the absence of industry-
driven letter-writing campaigns, the public strongly supported banning smoking
on aircraft.
The tobacco industry’s heavy reliance on its own employees to generate
data supporting its position (for example, letter-writing campaigns, petition
94 Cynthia Piattoni. Nelson, Ralston, and Robb Communications. 1988. Smoker’s Rights Alliance
Budget Update. 22 Jun. Bates No. TI01130417-TI01130425, accessed at http://tobaccodocuments.org/
nysa_ti_m1/TI01130417.html, 10 March 2005.
95 Lyons. Smokers Rights Alliances Airport Activities; Piattoni. Smoker’s Rights Alliance Budget
Update; Peter G. Sparber. 1988. 24 May. Bates No. TITX0030529, accessed at http://legacy.library.
ucsf.edu/tid/glv32f00, 16 March 2005.
96 Durbin. The Tobacco Industry’s Smoke Screen; ‘‘The Tobacco Industry’s Smoke Screen,’’
Congressional Record-Extension of Remarks 135, no. 111 (1989).
97 John Lyons. Tobacco Institute. 1989. 30 Nov. Bates No. TI01140044/0045, accessed at http://
legacy.library.usdf.edu/tid/udq30c00, 26 May 2005; Stuntz; John Lyons. Tobacco Institute. 1989.
13 Dec. Bates No. TI01140014, accessed at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fep30c00, 26 May 2005.
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drives, and smokers’ rights and other front groups) biases the representative-
ness of the public record. First, tobacco industry employees may have more-
favorable views about tobacco products than does the general population.
Second, the tobacco industry’s use of its employees is inherently coercive, as
the employee’s job security depends on the employer. Thus, some employees
may have participated in activities that did not accurately reflect their views.
The behavior of the tobacco industry in fighting airline smoking restric-
tions calls into question prevailing theoretical assumptions about interest group
behavior. Interest groups and lobbyists, in the circumstances we describe, may
purposefully provide inaccurate information, despite the efforts of competing
interest groups to forestall misrepresentation. Existing theories about lobbying
behavior propose that an investment in acquiring costly information about
constituent preferences and legislative policy outcomes, such as performing
public opinion surveys, is a means of increasing organizational credibility. In-
vestments in information gathering are perceived to differentiate groups that
possess credible information from those that do not.98 However, the fact that
interest groups possess accurate information does not mean that they will re-
veal it. For example, the tobacco industry did not make public the results of
its surveys that found support for airline smoking bans.
We proposed two conditions under which interest groups would misrep-
resent or withhold information: when the issue is perceived to be critical, and
when accurate information does not support interest group preferences. Our
research suggests that commitment to an extensive information-gathering and
lobbying campaign should not be viewed as a signal that interest groups are
presenting credible information.
Our findings have further implications for judging grassroots lobbying.
Although Congress sought to increase disclosure of interest group lobbying
through the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, the law does not require groups
that engage in activities meant to demonstrate grassroots support for legisla-
tion to register or report their funding sources.99 This exclusion means that
many efforts of the type used by the tobacco industry to influence policy, such
as letter-writing campaigns and the formation of front groups, are still not
reported. Although there is very limited research on these types of activities,
other industries have used similar strategies.100 Our results, which are con-
98 Wright, Interest Groups and Congress, 92; Kollman, Outside Lobbying; Esterling, The Political
Economy of Expertise; Potters and Van Winden, ‘‘Lobbying and Asymmetric Information,’’ 285.
99 Jeffrey Tenenbaum, Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995: A Summary and Overview for Associations
(Washington DC: Center for Association Leadership), accessed at http://www.centeronline.org/
knowledge/whitepaper.cfm?ID=1796, 16 March 2005.
100 Public Citizen, Why the Lobbying Disclosure Act Needs to be Broadened to Include Grass-Roots
Lobbying (Washington DC: Public Citizen), accessed at http://www.citizen.org/print_article.cfm?
ID=7861, 10 March 2005; Public Citizen, Lobbying Disclosure Act Recommendations. Problems with
and Recommended Changes to the Federal Lobbying Disclosure System (Washington DC: Public Citi-
zen), accessed at http://www.citizen.org/print_article.cfm?ID=6202, 16 March 2005; Arthur Mitchell,
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sistent with game-theoretical literature on the incentives of firms,101 suggest
that the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act should be modified to require that
organizations engaging in grassroots lobbying disclose their funding sources
and activities. Without such changes, interest groups may continue efforts to
mislead legislators about the extent of constituent support.
Our research has certain limitations. Conclusions drawn using internal
industry documents can be difficult to generalize, given that it is not always
clear whether plans made by industry actors were, in fact, implemented. Also,
the records are likely to be incomplete. To the extent possible, we sought to
circumvent these problems by relying on multiple outside sources, including
contemporaneous public records, press accounts, and other relevant research.
Other strengths of our data sources include the stability and unobtrusive na-
ture of the documents and other archival records.102 Although findings from a
single case study can neither confirm nor disconfirm existing theory,103 our
results are consistent with theoretical work attempting to describe corporate
lobbying incentives.104 Given the very limited existing empirical work on lob-
bying activities,105 this research enhances the understanding of interest groups
as information providers during the legislative process. Whenever a policy
proposal threatens a clearly defined interest group, particularly a corporate
interest group, lobbying tactics may include the misrepresentation of infor-
mation to policymakers.*
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